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Economic Rents and Essential Facilities
Keith N. Hylton'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents an economic analysis of the essential
facility doctrine of antitrust. According to this doctrine, a firm
or group of firms that possesses exclusive access to a costreducing facility must be prepared to share such access on fair
terms with competitors.1
Section II of this paper describes the essential facility
doctrine and its development. The doctrine, in its modern form,
appeared rapidly after the Associated Press2 decision, receiving
its first complete statement in Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit

*
Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, and Research
Fellow, American Bar Foundation. A.B., Harvard University; Ph.D. (Economics),
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author
thanks Ian Ayres for helpful comments, as well as participants in faculty
workshops at Boston University, New York University, Syracuse, and Cornell for
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1.
This is a durable and rough statement of the doctrine; a more complete
statement is provided in the next section of this paper. Not all essential facility
cases involve facilities that are clearly "cost-reducing." See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co.
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (concerning access to a
joint-marketing arrangement). However, when viewed in terms of the underlying
economics, this distinction is not important.
Facilities at the center of previous litigation in this area have included a series
of power lines, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973);
interconnections with local telephone services, MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983); and space in a building with a desirable location, Gamco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit & Produce Bldg. Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817
(1952). Airline computer reservation systems have been a recent subject of
litigation. See Stephen P. Mahlinka, Vertical Restraints as Exclusionary Practices:
Current Issues in Regulated and Deregulated Industries, 58 ANTITRUSr L.J. 921,
925-29 (1989); Note, The Legal and Regulatory Implications of Airline Computer
Reservation Systems, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1930 (1990).

2.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding that exclusion
of competitors from an essential network of information was an illegal combination
under the Sherman Act). Associated Press is discussed more fully infra notes 11821 and accompanying text.
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& Produce Building, Inc.3 Although it now states an
independent theory of antitrust liability, in some cases it can
be seen as a derivative of the leverage theory.4
Section III presents an economic model of an essential
facility dispute. The model reveals how the language in
essential facility cases is at odds with economic theory. For
example, essential facilities are treated as sources of monopoly
profits. The income earned through ownership of a costreducing facility is an economic rent, and rents are observed in
many relationships in which monopoly power is not an issue.
The model also examines whether essential facility claims
can be procompetitive, arriving at a disappointing answer.
First, and perhaps obviously, such claims are not necessarily
procompetitive because the firm gaining access to a
cost-reducing facility through a court-imposed sharing remedy
may enter into a collusive agreement with firms that already
have access to the facility. If collusion does not occur,
however, it is still not clear that shared access would yield
benefits to consumers. For example, if access-sharing raises
production costs for participating firms, welfare losses may
result.
Further, consideration must be given to the effect a
compulsory sharing rule would have on incentives to acquire
cost-reducing facilities. Such a rule would be undesirable if its
only effect was to discourage investment in cost-reducing
facilities. However, an access-sharing rule may benefit
consumers by discouraging anticompetitive, rent-seeking
investments, such as efforts to acquire economically
unjustifiable copyright or patent protection.
Section IV develops the arguments presented in Section III
by discussing some essential facility cases. The paper groups
the cases into three categories. One category involves access to
high-fixed, low-marginal cost resources (e.g., bridges). Another
involves access to joint venture activities (e.g., research
consortia). The third is a residual category, containing cases
that do not obviously raise the economic problems observed in
cases falling under the other two categories. The paper argues

3.
194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
4.
See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
leverage theory.
5.
Note that to the extent sharing access to an "essential facility" allows
participating firms to also share cost data, access-sharing may facilitate collusion.
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that in the absence of government regulation, application of the
essential facility doctrine is particularly troublesome in the
first two categories. In the first category of cases the doctrine is
likely to discourage investments in which a significant part of
the cost is sunk. In the second category, a compulsory sharing
rule is likely to discourage the provision, within the
consortium, of the public goods that make it a valuable
arrangement. The third category may include a subset of cases
in which these problems are not observed.
The article concludes that it is extremely difficult to
determine whether the essential facility doctrine will increase
consumer welfare in a particular case. A determination may
require the level of inquiry typically undertaken by public
utility regulators. For this reason, there should be a
presumption against claims that consumer welfare will be
enhanced by applying the essential facility doctrine to force
owners to share access with competitors. On the other hand, a
presumption against essential facility claims in regulated
markets is not clearly desirable because the doctrine may serve
as a disincentive to anticompetitive transfers of property rights
from public to private ownership. At the least, courts should be
sensitive to the difficulties presented by the separate categories
of cases identified in this paper.
II.

THE DOCTRINE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
A.

Doctrine

The most frequently-cited statement of the essential facility doctrine is Neale's summary: 'The Sherman Act requires
that where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by wouldbe competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to
be shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the scarce facility."6

6.

A.D.

NEaL,

THE ANTITRUSr LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A

STUDY OF COMPETITION ENFORCED BY LAW 67 (2d ed. 1970). For another
frequently-cited statement, see LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST § 48, at 131 (1977), which states the rule as follows: "[I]f a group of
competitors, acting in concert, operate a common facility and if due to natural
advantage, custom, or restrictions of scale, it is not feasible for excluded competitors to duplicate the facility, the competitors who operate the facility must give
access to the excluded competitors on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms."
Sullivan's statement is more restrictive than Neale's in that it requires joint activity. For a critique of some expansive interpretations of the doctrine, see Phillip
Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTI-
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Not surprisingly, courts and commentators differ in their
application of the doctrine. For example, most academic commentators think that the activity complained of must be joint
in order for the injured party to invoke the essential facility
docrine.' Courts do not impose such a restriction.8 Also, scholars write as if the plaintiff and the defendant must be competitors in order for the plaintiff to invoke the doctrine,9 but courts
are split on the issue.'"
B. Development of the Doctrine
Although cases attribute the essential facility doctrine to
United States v. Terminal Railroad," there are several theoTRUST L.J. 841 (1989).
7.
For statements of the doctrine provided by Neale and Sullivan, see supra
note 6 and accompanying text; see also 3 PHILLIF AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW
729g (1978).
8.
For example, United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D.
Minn. 1971), affd, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) and Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen
Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985), both of
which discuss the essential facility doctrine, did not involve joint activity. See also
MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1147 n.10
(7th Cir.) (rejecting argument that joint activity is required), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
891 (1983).
9.
This is obvious from the statements of the doctrine by Neale and Sullivan.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 7,
729g. PH[LLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
736.1a,
736.2e (Supp. 1987) provide a more general treatment of this issue, but still
conclude that the doctrine should be restricted to competitors.
10.
In support of limiting the doctrine to competitors, see Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding Inc., 824 F.2d 223, 230 (3rd Cir. 1987); Interface Group, Inc.
v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987); Fulton v. Hecht, 580
F.2d 1243, 124748 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Dart Drug
Corp. v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1097-98 & n.9 (D. Md. 1979);
Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636, 644 (D. Md. 1979), aftd, 636
F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 909 (1981).
In support of extending the doctrine to noncompetitors, see General Motors
Corp., 99 F.T.C. 464 (1982); accord LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.
1966); Venture Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Co., 1980-81 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 63,780, at 78,169 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 685 F.2d 41
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007 (1982); Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C.
1, 76-82 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). Although not stating this explicitly, the decision in Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 860 (6th Cir.
1979), in which the essential facility charge was brought by a customer-competitor,
implicitly supports extending the doctrine to noncompetitors.
11.
224 U.S. 383 (1912). In Terminal Railroad a group of railroads set up a
corporation which gained control of all terminal facilities in St. Louis. Consequently, a monopoly replaced a system in which three independent routes (two bridges
and one ferry) competed. A more detailed discussion of Terminal Railroad is
provided in the text accompanying notes 96-108.
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ries from which the doctrine could have been derived. Consider,
for example, the leverage theory of United States v. Griffith. 2
In one class of essential facility cases, the monopolist is using
his control over a scarce resource to determine which of several
firms will do well.3 For example, the monopolist may use its
control over the only local television station to channel advertising business in the direction of one agency.' 4 In this area,
the essential facility doctrine could be seen as a corollary to the
Griffith proposition.
Another holding from which a form of the essential facility
doctrine could be derived is American Federation of Tobacco
Growers v. Neal. 5 There the defendant trade association,
which had been given the power to regulate warehouse sales,
denied the plaintiff access to local auctions. Use of the essential
facility doctrine to prevent exclusion in such a case can be
defended as a means of preventing parties from exploiting, in a
manner which reduces consumer welfare, a transfer of government resources into private hands."
A more obvious argument could be based on the test for
monopolization." Denying access to some scarce resource may

12.
334 U.S. 100 (1948). The opinion is better known for the "Griffith formula,"
which states that "the use of monopoly power . . . to foreclose competition, to gain
a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful." Id. at 107.
Two cases often cited in support of the essential facility doctrine that rely on
-the leverage theory are Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958) and Six Twenty-Nine Prod., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting,
Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966).
13.
See James R. Ratner, Should There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 327, 360 (1988).
14.
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 255 F.2d 708.
15.
183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950).
16.
In general, a welfare-reducing transaction is more likely to occur when the
party acquiring the publicly-owned resource is not required to pay a fair price for
it. A similar argument, concerning the public-trust doctrine, Illinois Central R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), is made in Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust
Doctrine, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSITrUTIONAL ECONOMICS 324 (James D.
Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988). I should also note that a broadly similar justification of the essential facility doctrine is briefly stated in Bruce M.
Owen, Determining Optimal Access to Regulated Essential Facilities, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 887, 889 (1990) ("The original downstream bottleneck monopoly may be unwarranted, created and maintained by regulators in pursuit of some policy or political
goal.").
17.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570.71 (1966) (defining the
elements of Section 2 monopolization as: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen or historic accident.").
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evidence an intent to monopolize. Under this approach, the
essential facility doctrine would be subsumed under the intent
test.18
There may be other theories from which the essential facility doctrine could be derived. However, the question remains
how the doctrine, as an independent theory of antitrust liability, developed and came to be linked with Terminal Railroad.
The case offers almost nothing on this itself. 9 There is no
statement of an essential facility doctrine in the opinion. Indeed, the Court's effort to ground its decision in the facts suggests that it made no attempt to state a generally applicable
proposition. 0
The first discussion of TerminalRailroad in a federal court
opinion is found in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad,2 '
where the court briefly refers to it as a decision justifying an
examination of intent and purpose in deciding whether a combination violates the Sherman Act.22
The next discussion appears in United States v. Standard
Oil Co.,2 which is the first to treat Terminal Railroad as offering a theory of antitrust liability independent from the more
general intent test. The court cites Terminal Railroad as requiring the examination of the "effects" of a merger, whatever
the intent behind it.24 If one effect is to "keep others from entering the business," the merger causes an "undue or unreasonable restraint on trade."25
The third discussion appears in the dissent in C.E. Stevens

18. The Court took this approach, long before the Grinnell standard for Section
2 monopolization had been formulated, in United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 226
U.S. 61 (1912).
19.
See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 13, at 336 ("Significant facts severely constrain
a conclusion that the case established the general essential facility concept . . .");
David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an
Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J.L. & ECON. 419 (1990).
20.
Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 405.
21.
226 U.S. 61 (1912). The opinion concerned the purchase by Union Pacific
Railroad Company of a controlling 46% of the stock of the Southern Pacific Compa.
ny. The Court held that the purchase led to an illegal combination in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
22.
Id. at 93.
23.
47 P.2d 288 (D.Mo. 1931) (holding that the United States could not enjoin
a planned merger between the Standard Oil Company of New York and the
Vacuum Oil company on the ground that it violated a decree resulting from
previous antitrust litigation).
24.
Id. at 296-98.
25.
Id. at 298.
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Co. v. Foster & Kleiser Co.,26 which refers to Terminal Railroad as establishing the proposition that "intent [to monopolize] can be inferred from the extent of control... ," again
suggesting that the Terminal Railroad doctrine is subsumed
under the intent test.
Thus, before 1945 courts do not articulate a principle similar to Neale's statement of the bottleneck doctrine. 2' Two of
the three discussions of Terminal Railroad in the federal court
opinions treat it as merely another case justifying the examination of intent.29
The turning point seems to have been Justice Douglas'
0 Discussing remedies
concurring opinion in Associated Press."
generally, Douglas briefly drew an analogy between granting
competitors access to the Associated Press network and the
problem
of granting competitors access in Terminal Rail31
road.
From this point the doctrine developed rapidly. Gamco, Inc.
v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, Inc.,2 comes close to
stating the doctrine in its present form.33 The First Circuit
held that it "is incumbent on one with the monopolist's power
to deny a substantial economic advantage.., to a competitor
to come forward with some business justification."35 Gamco
also presents alternative bases for its holding-in particular,
the leverage theory of Griffith and the public trust theory underlying American Tobacco Growers v. Neal.36
It was not until 1971 that the essential facility doctrine
again received significant attention in a federal court opin-

26.
109 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 311 U.S. 255 (1940).
27.
Id. at 772 (Haney J., dissenting).
28.
See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
29.
Union Pacific, 226 U.S. at 93; C.E. Stevens, 109 F.2d at 772.
30.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
31.
Id. at 25 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32.
194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
33.
Cf. Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 433 (1987) (stressing importance of Gamco in the
development of essential facility doctrine).
34.
Judge Clark, of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation, wrote the opinion
for the majority. Gamco, 194 F.2d at 485 n.1.
35.
Id. at 489.
36.
Id. at 487. The requirement of "indispensability" (brought up and rejected
in Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 18) is also discussed. The court notes that the
existence of alternative sites does little to help the defendant's case ("The short answer .. .is that a monopolized resource seldom lacks substitutes; alternatives will
not excuse monopolization."). Gamco, 194 F.2d at 487.
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ion.' In the meantine, Neale's first edition of Antitrust Laws
of the United States of America was published. Viewed in light
of the discussion in Gamco of the "duty" to provide access,
Neale's claim that the cases exhibited an underlying doctrine
that "where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated.., those
in possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair
terms" reflected an expansive reading. 38
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co.39 was the next case
to discuss Terminal Railroad, and the first opinion following
Associated Press to clearly distinguish the doctrine of Terminal
Railroad from traditional intent analysis.4" The court cites
Neale's discussion of the bottleneck theory of antitrust law as
providing an alternative basis, independent of the intent test,
for finding a violation of the antitrust law in Otter Tail's refusal to allow other power sources to use its subtransmission
lines.4 Some recent cases follow Otter Tail closely in distinguishing the doctrine of Terminal Railroad from traditional
37.
However, two cases decided after Gamco shed some light on the
then-prevailing interpretation of Terminal Railroad. One is Seatrain Lines Inc. v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 108 F. Supp. 113 (D. N.J. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 916
(1953), decided later in the same year as Gamco. Seatrain, which operated barges
capable of carrying 100 railroad cars, brought suit to enjoin several railroads from
denying it access to their freight cars. Seatrain's complaint was dismissed. Although the opinion says nothing of the essential facility doctrine, it is noted that
"Seatrain argues that the combination is a simple breach of the antitrust laws for
which it is entitled to relief by way of injunction and damages under such decisions of the United States Supreme Court as United States v. Terminal Railroad
Association, . .. and Associated Press v. United States." 108 F. Supp. at 120. The
statement suggests awareness, at least on Seatrain's part, of something resembling
the modern interpretation of the doctrine of Terminal Railroad.Also, Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin, 186 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aftd, 292 F. 2d 794
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961) cites Terminal Railroad and Associated
Pess for the proposition that "terminal facilities may be established cooperatively . . . provided that they are made available on a non-discriminatory basis" Id. at
540.
38.
NEALE, supra note 6, at 67.
39.
331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), affd, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). In Otter Tail,
municipalities sought to compete with the Otter Tail Power Company by acquiring
their own electric facilities. However, the municipalities could not afford to construct their own subtransmission lines and Otter Tail refused to wheel power
supplied by other generators over its subtransmission lines. For further discussion
of Otter Tail, see infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
40.
This was the approach in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F.2d 288
(D. Mo. 1931), but it obviously did not catch on then.
41.
The Supreme Court affirmed the relevant part of the judgment but neither
approved nor disapproved of the discussion of the essential facility doctrine. See
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); see also Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520 n.13 (10th Cir. 1984),
affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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intent analysis.42
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE ECONOMICS OF
FACILITY-SHARING

Given its status as part of the modern arsenal of antitrust
plaintiffs," it is surprising that the essential facility doctrine

has received little rigorous

examination

from the

economically-oriented antitrust commentators. Why would a

plaintiff find it necessary to bring such a claim when at some
price almost any firm will share access to a scarce resource
within its possession? Is it reasonable to infer that all essential
facility plaintiffs are merely disappointed suitors, asking the

court to grant access cheaply when the market would not? Are
such suits likely to yield benefits to consumers? This section
considers these questions within the framework of a simple
model of an essential facility dispute.
A.

SharingAccess: Basic Considerations

Suppose two firms, A and B, produce widgets. Firm B's
average production cost is $3. Firm A's average cost is less
than $3 in the relevant output range, because firm A has ac-

cess to a cost-reducing facility.4 Moreover, because firm A
alone has access to the cost-reducing facility, a new entrant

would find itself in the same position as firm B. Assume, however, that entry is easy.
Suppose firms A and B compete on the basis of price (but

42.
See, e.g., Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979).
The essential facility cases following Otter Tail seem to have contributed little to
the doctrine's development. For example, Hecht v. Pro-Football,Inc. repeats Neale's
statement and goes on to say that an essential facility "need not be indispensable"
and does not have to be shared 'if such sharing would be impractical or would
inhibit the defendant's ability to serve its customers adequately." 570 F.2d 982, 992
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). Similar statements can be found
in Gamco. Similarly, MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) provides a four-part test:
"(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use
of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility." Id.
at 1132-33.
43.
A WESTLAW search will reveal that the number of cases mentioning
Terminal Railroad increases dramatically after 1971.
44.
The assumption that "essential facilities" are cost-reducing facilites runs
throughout the literature. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, T 736.1a
(describing essential facility as providing "substantial cost advantage").
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not quality). If they charge a high price, say $4 per widget,
each will have an incentive to undersell the other, leading to
price competition and perhaps losses; moreover, an entrant
may come along and bloody the market with new competition.
An obvious solution for firm A is to charge $2.99 per widget
and take the market to itself. Since A is guaranteed a stable
flow of profits, this is the likely outcome of competition. Since
the lower price eliminates the incentive for new firms to enter
the market, I will refer to $2.99 as an "entry-blockading" price.
Further, for simplicity I will sometimes use terminology from
the limit-pricing literature45 and refer to firm A as the "incumbent" and firm B as the "entrant."
In this model, firm B is unable to share the market with
firm A as long as the two compete in price. Moreover, consumers benefit by paying $2.99 per widget instead of the higher $4
which they would pay if the two firms shared the market.
Thus, if any gains are to be enjoyed by consumers through A's
granting access to the facility to firm B, they must result because the two firms continue to compete in price after both
have access to the cost-reducing facility.4" But this is not a
guaranteed outcome. The firms may collude after reaching an
agreement to share access to the facility, leaving consumers
worse off."7
It may help to pause at this stage and consider some of the
implications of this hypothetical. Sharing access to a cost-reducing facility may or may not yield benefits to consumers. In
this example, if firms compete after agreeing to share access,
consumers will benefit because each firm with access to the

45.
A firm "limit-prices" whan it charges just below the price at which a new
firm would find it profitable to enter the market. For an introduction, see F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 233, 243
(2d ed. 1980).

46.
Since the issue will arise again, I should note here that the two firms will
compete after entering into an access-sharing arrangement only under special
circumstances. Suppose firm A charges firm B for access to the cost-reducing
facility. If firm A charges a sufficiently high royalty on each sale made by firm B,
firm A can effectively prevent firm B from using price to compete against it.
However, if firm A charges firm B a lump sum access fee, firm B will be able to
compete against firm A at the same low-unit cost level that firm A faces. Thus,
later discussion in the text of firm B competing against firm A under a sharing
agreement assumes that firm A is, for some reason, unable to force, or "bond",
firm B to keep its price at a certain level.
47.
Consumers would be worse off because the two firms together would charge
$4 per widget instead of the $2.99 that would be charged when firm A "blocks out"
firm B. Sharing access to a cost-reducing facility may facilitate collusion.
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facility will be able to undercut the entry-blockading price
level. On the other hand, with shared access to the facility it
may become clear to the competing firms that since neither
possesses a cost advantage there is little to be gained by trying
to underprice the other. In this sense, shared access may itself
be a "facilitating mechanism"' for collusion. However, the
incentive to cheat49 and the possibility of new entrants also
gaining access to the facility serve to lessen this incentive to
collude.
The strength of the incentive to cheat on a collusive agreement is difficult to quantify.5" In general, the larger the number of firms sharing access to the cost-reducing facility, and the
harder it is for participating firms to monitor each other's
activites, the greater the incentive to compete in price. Thus,
where conditions permit easy entry, allowing entrants to gain
access to the cost-reducing facility will effectively police the
behavior of firms which have access to the facility. Moreover,
even if entrants could not gain access to the facility, they would
nevertheless provide competition to the incumbent firms to the
extent that the incumbents could not set price above the average cost of the lowest-cost entrant.
This discussion has implications that run counter to traditional ways of thinking about the essential facility doctrine, as
expressed in court opinions. Most judicial opinions assume that
the firm which has access to the facility is avoiding competition
by denying access to another firm. However, this view fails to
recognize that the "outside" firm is already providing competition. The entrant firm's ability to undercut the incumbent firm
at any price that exceeds its average cost forces the incumbent
to share cost advantages with consumers, and this is what
competition is supposed to do. The decision by the incumbent
not to share access with a competitor does not mean that the
incumbent is able to operate free from competition.
The decision whether to share a scarce facility is more

48.
The term paraphrases Areeda's "facilitating practice" which is any practice
that facilitates oligopolistic collusion. See PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 9 1407
(1986).
49.
There is generally an incentive to cheat because collusive agreements are
usually not "self-enforcing" or "Nash" equilibria. A theory covering the exceptions,
and antitrust implications, is presented in Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A
Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987).
50.
See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 45, at 160-64 for a general discussion of the
problem.
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complicated than the usual discussions imply. The decision to
deny access may be based on a desire to avoid having to compete with a firm that possesses the same cost advantage, and
in this sense may reflect an anticompetitive intent. However,
the decision to grant access may follow an agreement to collude, which would also reflect anticompetitive intent. A reasonable approach to the essential facility doctrine obviously must
take these issues into consideration.
A deeper sense in which this discussion is at odds with
traditional analyses concerns the very definition of profit. I
have referred to firm A as -having a competitive advantage
because it has exclusive access to a cost-reducing facility. This
should not be taken to mean that firm A receives a monopoly
profit.
Monopoly profit, as a type of economic profit, is profit in
excess of opportunity cost.5 ' In a competitive industry, economic profit is driven to zero by entry. In the model discussed
here, firm A makes a profit when it charges the entry-blockading price $2.99 as long as its average cost is below $2.99. For
example, if firm A's average cost is $1.99, then it makes a profit of $100 when it produces 100 widgets. However, this is not
necessarily an economic profit; it is an economic profit only if it
exceeds the opportunity cost of the cost-reducing facility. The
opportunity cost of the facility is its maximum value in the
next best alternative use. Thus if firm B is more efficient than
A, and could lower its average cost to $0.99 if it had the same
cost-reducing facility as firm A, the value of the facility to firm
B would be $200. In this case firm B could offer to purchase
the facility from A for $120 and both firms would benefit from
the exchange. Thus, if firm B is more efficient than A, A would
make less than its opportunity cost in the equilibrium in which
it blocks out firm B by charging $2.99, even though its accounting books would show a profit. If firm B is equally efficient,
firm A would make an accounting profit just equal to its opportunity cost. If firm B were less efficient, firm A would make
more than the opportunity cost of the facility, the excess reflecting a rent accruing to its superior efficiency, which itself
has a value on the market. For example, if firm A's superior
efficiency results from the presence of better managers, firm B

51.
For a discussion of monopoly profit, opportunity cost, and economic profit,
see FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM 219-69 (1983).
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would be more efficient if it instead "owned" the same managers. Thus, with the value of the management team and the
value of the facility taken into opportunity cost, firm A still
makes no profit above its opportunity cost, and thus no monopoly profit.
My point is that the language of monopoly power and monopoly profit is to some extent misplaced when used in reference to essential facility disputes. Exclusive access to a scarce,
cost-reducing
facility does not by itself generate monopoly prof52
its.

B.

Voluntary Sharing:Incentives and Implicationsfor
Consumer Welfare
1. Access sharing:necessary conditions
Given low transaction costs, which describes the situation
of the firms bargaining over access to a cost-reducing facility,
one might think that access-sharing will take place only when
it is socially desirable.53 However, this intuition is probably
wrong. Firms bargaining over access to a cost-reducing facility
may not take consumers' interests into account.54 Thus, there
is little reason to believe that observed patterns of voluntary
sharing are socially efficient. Voluntary sharing is explored
here, using the model introduced in the previous section.

52.
To see this, note that in figure 1, firm A is not producing at the monopoly
output level - its price-output is constrained by potential competition from firm B.
It might be argued that this point is irrelevant, given the thrust of this paper.
The question examined here is whether use of the essential facility doctrine to
force owners to share access is socially desirable. The answer to this question does
not obviously depend on whether profits are characterized as monopoly rents or
competitive rents. The problem with this line of reasoning is that the description of
the source of rents is crucial. Common reference to the rents earned from ownership of a cost-reducing facility as monopoly rents eventually takes on life of its
own, leading the typical observer to believe that such rents are unearned or necessarily the result of anticompetitive behavior.
53.
This would seem to be implied by the Coase Theorem, which states that in
the absence of transaction costs parties will bargain themselves to an efficient arrangement, R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
54.
For example, the firms negotiating a sharing agreement may decide to
collude and raise price to the monopoly level. Since monopoly is inefficient, this
clearly would not be in the best interests of consumers. Of course, the mere fact
that monopoly is inefficient implies something interesting: the firms could always
make themselves (and consumers) better off by charging a two-part tariff with
price set at marginal cost. Transaction costs and informational asymmetry suggest
that this solution is not always available, and for this reason we sometimes
observe monopolies setting price above marginal cost.
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If firm B could gain access to the essential facility, it would
be able to produce widgets under the same technological constraints as firm A, thus facing the same costs.55 Firm A would
then be forced to share the market with firm B. Clearly, one
way for firm B to gain access is to offer a payment for access to
the facility. Under what conditions is this payment likely to be
exchanged?
Firm A will accept the payment if its net income, including
the payment, is at least as great as its net income when it
charges $2.99 per widget and thereby blocks out firm B. Let P'A
be firm A's expected profit from producing widgets when it
charges $2.99. Let PA be firm A's expected profit when it
shares the scarce resource with firm B. Let "s" represent the
payment from B to A. Firm A will accept the payment from B,
in exchange for granting access to its facility, when
P2^ + S > P'A.

Firm B will find the payment for access attractive when its
economic profit is positive, since in this case it is doing better
than if required to exit the industry altogether. Let P2B be firm
B's expected profit when it is allowed access the scarce resource. Thus, firm B will offer the payment if
I"B > S.

It follows that an arrangement to share access to a costreducing facility is likely to take place voluntarily only when
joint profits under the sharing arrangement are no less than
the profit of the firm which owns the facility when it sets price
at an entry-blockading level, i.e., when
P2

+ P'1 > P1A-

Sharing access is mutually beneficial when and only when joint
profits under the sharing arrangement exceed the profit of the
facility-owner when it sets price at an entry-blockading level.
2. Mutually beneficial sharing
In the case in which joint profits exceed the profit of the
facility-owner acting alone there is a "rent surplus" resulting
from the sharing arrangement. What is the source of this surplus?
Consider Figure 1. Let (100, $2.99) be the profit-maximizing quantity and price combination for the firm which has
access to the cost-reducing facility when it sets an entry-block-

55.

Provided that the access fee is a lump sum payment. See supra note 46.
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access to the cost-reducing facility when it sets an entry-blockading price. Suppose sharing access itself produces no technological benefits that further reduce production costs. 56 Thus,
when access to the facility is shared, both firms produce under
the same cost conditions as firm A (the ACA curve shown in
Figure 1 represents the average cost of their joint output).
Since, by hypothesis (100, $2.99) is the profit-maximizing
output-price combination when firm A produces alone, subject
to potential competition from firm B, the joint production level
must be to the left of this,5" i.e., below 100 widgets. Otherwise, firm A would produce more than 100 widgets when it has
the market to itself. But if the firms jointly produce less, they
must also charge a price higher than $2.99."8 Since the firms
produce less and charge a higher price, the inescapable conclusion is that consumers are worse off. Thus, if the mere act of
sharing access does not enhance the cost advantage provided by
the facility, then voluntary sharing, provided it is preferable to
non-sharing from the perspective of each of the participating
firms, reduces consumer welfare.

56.
In some cases the act of sharing itself may increase the cost advantage
provided by the facility, see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
57.
It should be noted that this assumes that the monopoly price that would be
set by firm A is greater than the average cost of firm B, AC,. If the monopoly
price were less than AC5 , then firm B's presence would have no effect on firm A's
pricing. (Otherwise, firm B would have to bluff firm A into thinking it was actually a low-cost producer, which is very unlikely.) In this case, even though firm A
acts as a monopolist, consumers would still be better off buying from firm A at its
monopoly price than from firm B. Throughout this discussion I have been assuming
that firm A's monopoly price is greater than AC,.
58.
They will charge the same price because with costs equalized there is no
incentive to compete in price.

1258 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1991
Economic Rents and Essential Facilities

$/unit

(100, $2.99)

ACB

ACA
Demand
quantity

1243]

ECONOMIC RENTS

1259

This need not be the case if sharing access enhances the
cost advantage provided by the facility. For example, firm B
may have perfected some technology which allows it to reduce
the joint costs of A and B when access to the facility is
shared." It is not necessarily the result that the joint
profit-maximizing price and output combination lies to the left
of (100, $2.99) along the market demand curve.6" Since the
price and quantity combination may entail higher output and a
lower price, consumer welfare may be enhanced by an agreement to share access to the facility.61
To summarize, when sharing yields a profit, or more accurately a rent surplus, a voluntary agreement among the firms
to share access to a cost-reducing facility may or may not be
welfare-enhancing from the point of view of consumers. If there
are no technological benefits flowing from shared access, voluntary sharing will be mutually beneficial, as between the two
participating firms, only under an anticompetitive agreement.
However, if there are significant technological benefits, consumers may benefit even though the firms sharing access to
the facility operate under an anticompetitive agreement.
The intuitive explanation for this conclusion is fairly
straightforward. Given that the two firms will find sharing
mutually beneficial only when there is a rent surplus resulting
from the agreement, we must determine the sources of this
surplus. There are only two: monopoly profits from collusion or
efficiency gains that can be realized only through sharing access.
3. Non-mutually beneficial sharing
Voluntarily sharing may also occur when joint profits un-

In this case the ACA curve shown in Figure 1 shifts down when access to
59.
the facility is shared. How might this happen? Consider the news-sharing network
in Associated Press. For a small network, the pooling benefits achieved by expanding to include new members may outweight the costs. For further discussion of
this case, see infra text accompanying notes 118-21.
60.
In other words, the price/output combination chosen by a monopolist in this
position may be at a point where output is higher and price lower.
61.
Alternatively, shared access may shift the demand curve for the product
outward, as was claimed in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585 (1985). Since this case does not raise new and analytically different
problems, I restrict the discussion to the case where shared access generates cost
reductions.
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der the sharing arrangement are equal to the profits of the
facility owner acting alone (i.e., charging the entry-blockading
price). In this case, there is no rent surplus resulting from the
sharing agreement and Firm A will share access only if Firm B
compensates it for the forgone profit. Both firms are indifferent
as between the sharing arrangement and the outcome in which
firm A acts alone.
4. The "metering"problem: why the necessary conditions for
sharingmay not be suffrcient
The discussion to this point has stated necessary conditions for access sharing in the case of a cost-reducing facility.
The conditions stated are not sufficient because the terms of
the agreement to share access have important implications.
If the owner of the facility grants access to another firm, it
will in some cases desire constraints on the competitive actions
of the firm seeking access. For example, if the facility owner
has incurred a large sunk cost in developing the facility, the
rent earned from the facility will help recoup the costs of development. In this case the owner of the facility will not want to
be denied the chance to recoup its costs by the competitor who
is granted access.
The obvious way to prevent this is to enter into a pricefixing agreement, but this is illegal. An alternative approach is
to charge a fee for each unit of the competitor's output. If the
fee is appropriately set, it will serve as a floor on the
competitor's pricing. For example, if firm B is required to pay
$.99 per unit of output, its unit cost would be $2.99 under the
sharing agreement, which would remove the incentive for firm
B to compete in price. A single 'lump-sum" access fee, unrelated to the competitor's output rate, will not protect the incumbent. From the perspective of firm B, the lump-sum fee is a
sunk cost after payment, so it has every reason to compete with
respect to price after gaining access to the facility.
Although the per-unit access fee is a solution in theory,
practically, it would be very hard and in some cases impossible
to determine." For example, it may be very costly to accurately measure the output of firm B. Alternatively, there may be

62.
See David J. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist's Duty to Deal: A
Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "Essential Facilities", 74 VA. L.
REV. 1069, 1088-91, (1988) (discussing the "metering" problem).
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other difficult-to-measure ways in which sharing access diminishes the future stream of rents to A. For example, firm B, as a
lessee of sorts, may not take the same care in using the facility
as would the owner.6"
The problem of protecting A's claim to a future stream of
rents may be described as one of opportunism, but a more accurate term is "time-inconsistency." Access sharing may be potentially profitable, but in sharing access the owner of the facility
exposes itself to the risk that the firm granted access will compete with respect to price after gaining access to the facility. If
the rent earned from the facility is only sufficient to recoup the
costs of development plus a normal profit, the facility owner
will be reluctant to expose itself to such competition.
C. Incentives to Acquire an Essential Facility
Up to this point I have treated the cost-reducing facility as
if it appeared out of thin air. However, because most cost-reducing facilities must be developed, the effects of a sharing
requirement on incentives to develop or to acquire such facilities must be examined.
1. Incentives to acquire a cost-reducingfacility
Well-known justifications of patent law provide an immediate and intuitively obvious proposition: requiring firms to share
access will generally reduce incentives to acquire cost-reducing
facilities. 4
63.

This is an example of the "agency cost" problem discussed in its most

general form in Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974), and further
elaborated in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976). For example, the wheeling of electric power requires consideration of
incentive issues discussed in the agency cost literature. Joskow and Schmalensee,
discussing the pooling of electric power, note that "[elven in a brokerage arrangement, a substantial amount of cooperative activity is required to set up a

system and to keep it functioning satisfactorily" PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD
SCIMALENSEE, MARIKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTIITY DEREGULATION 71 (1983).
64.
Although there seems to be little empirical evidence demonstrating the incentive effects of patent rights, some very sketchy evidence can be obtained from
comparisons of patent protection regimes across countries. Consider the following:
Although impossible to quantify, trade in ideas seems to be flourishing
where patent protection is strong. Trade in ideas is the sole business of
America's Battelle Institute. In 1925 Battelle had revenues of $3.5 [million] and 30 employees; in 1987 it had revenues of $610 [million] and
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Consider firm A's incentive to develop or acquire a facility
which will lower its unit cost from $3 to $2. If the facility allows it to earn rents by underpricing fnm B at $2.99, then the
value of the facility is the stream of $.99 on every sale. Suppose, then, that after developing the facility, firm A is required
to share access with firm B. If A is able to charge B its forgone
profit on each of B's sales, i.e., $.99 per unit sold by firm B, A
will obviously be compensated in full for granting access to
B.65 Thus, if firm A is able to charge a compensating access
fee, forcing A to share access with B would not discourage the
development of a cost-reducing facility.
Of course, nothing in the essential facility doctrine guarantees that the stream of rents accruing to the facility-developer
will be protected. In particular, such rents may not be protected or protectable because it is impossible, for reasons discussed
in the
previous section, to implement a compensating access
66
fee.

2. Acquiring facilities that raise competitors' costs
If all essential facilities were of the cost-reducing variety,
this analysis probably would dispose of the issue. However, a
firm might find it profitable to invest in a facility, which has
the effect of raising the costs of competing firms. 7 For exam-

8,000 employees ....
Threats to patent protection, by contrast, seem to stifle trade. Mexico,

for one, threatened to force drug companies to hand over production of
their wares to local firms - rather as a compulsory license would do.
The drug companies countered with a threat to abandon the Mexican
market entirely. Though the government backed down, American drug
firms are still leery of exposing too much of their technology south of the
border.
Whose Idea Is It Anyway?, THE ECONOMIST, November 12, 1988, at 73-74.

The other side of the coin is that strong patent protection, besides being redundant as an incentive device in some cases, encourages rent-seeking efforts to claim
patent protection. For example, in the U.S., firms have appeared whose sole purpose is to finance patent litigation. See Edmund L. Andrews, Financing Inventors'
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMEs, March 11, 1989, at 36.
65.
This conveniently assumes that the facility will not need to be repaired
over time. If facility repair will be required, the fully-compensating per unit access

fee must also cover depreciation costs.
66.
If this is so, firm A will be left with either an uncompensating per unit
access fee, a lump sum access fee, or some combination of both.
67.
This is the "raising rivals' costs" problem emphasized in Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs
to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). This is Krattenmaker and
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ple, a firm may attempt to acquire copyright or patent protection for no other reason than to extract rents from, or to ex-

clude, competitors.68 A sharing requirement would be desirable in this case because it would prevent firms from profitably
effecting such acquisitions.
The problem, then, becomes one of distinguishing between
two types of acquisition: (1) cost-reducing facilities; and (2)
facilities that raise competitors' costs. Application of a sharing
requirement would be undesirable in the former case and desir-

able in the latter.
Can these two types of acquisition be distinguished by
courts? Probably not in all cases, though some success might be
achieved through application of doctrine already developed in

copyright and in patent law. 9 But regardless of whether
courts can distinguish the types of acquisition, there are reasons to believe that the purely anticompetitive, rent-seeking
acquisition will be observed for the most part in rather special

circumstances.
The first reason is that purely anticompetitive acquisitions
of essential facilities are unlikely to be profitable when substitutes to the facility are available. ° For example, suppose a
firm purchases a bridge, with the intention of charging higher

Salop's interpretation of the facts in Terminal Railroad. Id. at 234-36. The discussion in the text accompanying notes 96-108 takes no position on this interpretation.
68.
That is, a firm may seek copyright protection even though the economic
justification for granting such protection is weak - for example, protection of a
design which is a trivial variation of something in the public domain. See, e.g., L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (concerning copyrightability of
plastic toy savings bank which was itself a close copy of a design in the public
domain), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales &
Serv., 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff sought copyright protection for
common legal form), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). Similarly, as long as the
patent validity requirement is less than perfectly enforced, firms have incentives to
seek patent protection for obvious inventions, e.g., Martin J. Adelnan, Property
Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 977, 987 (1977).
69.
For example, the doctrine developed from patent-licensing cases may be useful in distinguishing facilities that are "cost-reducing" from those that raise
competitors' costs. See Gerber, supra note 62, at 1103-07 (discussing efforts in
patent cases to distinguish patents that are "highly productive" from those that are
"restrictive" in the sense that they serve largely to limit competition). Similarly,
copyright doctrine protecting "originality," and in some cases mere diligence, might
be useful in distinguishing cost-reducing and anticompetitive acquisitions. See, e.g.,
National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
70.
See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).
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rates to competitors who use the bridge. This would provide an
opportunity for ferry service providers to earn profits by charging lower rates to the newly-disadvantaged competitors. Thus,
if substitutes to the essential facility can easily enter, the value
of a purely anticompetitive acquisition will be quite small.
The second reason purely anticompetitive acquisitions will
be limited is familiar in the predatory pricing literature: they
are unlikely to profitable. For a rent-seeking acquisition to be
profitable, the owner must recover the costs of acquisition.
Acquiring a facility that raises a competitor's costs is analogous
to engaging in a predatory pricing campaign. Both involve
incurring up-front costs in expectation of future monopoly profits. But a slight risk of later entry by a lower-cost competitor
can significantly reduce the expected profitability of such an
acquisition. 1 One might argue that the owner has an incentive to acquire a reputation for toughness, which will deter
future entry. But this argument is subject to the "chain store"
paradox critique: the reputation for toughness will deter entry
only if predatory action is credible, and it is credible only if it is
rational ex post, which is doubtful in this and the predatory
pricing context. 72
The final reason purely anticompetitive acquisitions will be
limited to special circumstances is that in a market in which
competitive bidding for possession of an essential facility takes
place, the incentive to make a purely anticompetitive acquisition will often be weak. For example, if there are several equally efficient firms, i.e., no lowest-cost producer, it is unlikely
that any one of them will be able to profitably acquire a facility
whose only effect is to put competitors at a disadvantage. The
reason is that such a facility will be valuable for the same
71.
See Frank H. Easterbrock, PredatoryStrategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263, 273-75 (1981).
72.
Predation is often not rational ex post because the incumbent firm is usually better off sharing the market with a new rival rather than starting a price
war with the rival. This critique of predatory pricing was first stated in the
antitrust literature in Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CIH. L. REV. 263, 284-88 (1981). I use the term "chain
store paradox" because Easterbrook's criticism had been developed earlier in the
more technical economics literature. In that literature the criticism was referred to
as the chain store paradox problem. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982). The
term "chain store paradox" was apparently coined by Reinhard Selten, who offered
the paradox as an illustration of the perfectness problem in extensive games. See
Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, in 9 THEORY AND DECISIONS 127
(1978).
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reason to many competing firms. The firm that beats out its
competitors in the auction will be forced to pay full value for
the facility,7" eliminating the gain from acquisition.
If firms are not equally efficient, the facility would most
likely wind up in the hands of the most efficient producer.
However, the efficient producer could achieve the same result
by simply underpricing its rivals. For this reason the existence
of an essential facility would not necessarily affect the structure (i.e., who survives competition) of the industry. In addition, it does not follow that the lowest-cost firm will always be
able to profitably acquire the facility. As long as there is some
"hold-out" value to the less efficient firms in gaining possession
of the facility,7 4 the lowest-cost firm may be prevented from
making a profitable acquisition.
This argument implies that acquisitions of facilities that
merely raise rivals' costs will occur for the most part in settings
where substitutes to the essential facility are unavailable and
competitive bidding for possession of the facility is restricted.
The most common example of this setting involves the transfer
of a public resource into private hands through some process
which effectively restricts competitive bidding.7 5 Indeed, all
private efforts to generate legislation which puts rivals at a
competitive disadvantage' can be thought of as efforts to acquire "facilities" that raise competitors' costs. Since this sort of
activity takes place in a non-market setting, the reasons given
for thinking that the incentives to make purely anticompetitive

73.
The counterstrategies of rivals, in an auction for possession of an essential
facility, are briefly discussed in Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for Exclusionary Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
74.
Suppose the facility is worth $100 to firm A and $10 to firn B. Then the
"hold out" value to firm B is any price between $10 and $100. Firm B has an
incentive to acquire the facility as long as it can resell it for more than the price
paid.
75.
This suggests alarmingly vast areas in which the essential facility doctrine
might be helpful: regulated industries (particularly franchises granted by government agencies), patents, and copyrights.
76.
Generally, efforts to have taxes or tariffs imposed on competing firms easily
fall within this category. However, efforts to put rivals at a disadvantage can be
and often are more subtle than this. For example, safety or environmental regulations can be influenced in ways that tilt the playing field in favor of certain firms.
See Ann P. Bartel & Lacy G. Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A
New Look at OSHA's Impact, 28 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1985) (presenting evidence that
OSHA's enforcement of health and safety regulations favor large, unionized firms
at the expense of small, non-unionized firms). ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 347-64 (1978), offers additional examples.
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acquisitions are generally weak do not apply.
Thus, in spite of its inconsistency with patent law justifications, the essential facility doctrine is potentially desirable as a
means of discouraging acquisitions that only raise competitors'
costs. But in markets in which entry is generally easy and
competitive bidding for possession of facilities occurs, the essential facility doctrine will be less useful as a disincentive to
purely anticompetitive acquisitions.77 Anticompetitive acquisitions are more likely to involve the transfer of a resource or
claim by the government to a private party.7"
3. Summary
The essential facility doctrine is not clearly desirable or
undesirable when viewed on welfare grounds. Consumers
might benefit if firms A and B compete subject to lower unit
costs, or if access-sharing itself enhances the cost advantage
provided by the facility. However, this must be weighed against
its discouraging effect on incentives to develop cost-reducing
facilities. The doctrine also discourages acquisition of facilities
that raise competitors' costs (e.g., the rent-seeking copyright),
but this benefit is probably limited to circumstances not requiring a doctrine so broad in application. The theoretical ambiguity surrounding the doctrine suggests that a closer examination
of the cases may yield insights.
IV. RECURRENT FACT PATTERNS AND CASES

The essential facility cases obviously are more complicated
than the simple model discussed in the previous section. How-

77.
Conversely, if entry is difficult and competitive bidding restricted, claims
brought under the essential facility doctrine could provide substantial benefits to
consumers. Note that this provides an argument for basing antitrust liability on
efforts to influence regulatory b:ards (because such boards often restrict entry and
dole out property rights by means other than competitive auctions). The argument
presented in chapter 18 of BOR; supra note 76, distinguising the doctrine of Noerr
(Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961)) from the decision in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972), is broadly similar.
78.
This provides justification for the relationship suggested in Section III
between the essential facility and public trust doctrines. Although the general
question whether successful rent-seeking transfers (e.g., legislation which raises
competitors' costs) usually require the cooperation of government has been largely
ignored in the recent literature, a forceful argument that government participation
is usually necessary is provided in Thomas DiLorenzo, The Domain of Rent.Seeking
Behavior: Private or Public Choice?, 4 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 185 (1984).
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ever, there are recurrent fact patterns that can be considered
abstractly. One such pattern, exemplified by TerminalRailroad
and Otter Tail, involves access to some high-fixed, low-marginal
cost facility, like a bridge. 9 A second recurrent fact pattern
involves an attempt by firm B to gain entry into a joint venture
or consortium, as in Associated Press. The third pattern involves the attempt by firm B to share in the locational advantage enjoyed by firm A. Gamco is an example. I refer to these
fact patterns as 'ridge," 'joint venture," and "location" cases
respectively.
These types of cases can be ranked in terms of the risks of
potential welfare losses presented by the imposition of a compulsory sharing rule under the essential facility doctrine.
Bridge and joint venture cases are difficult to rank because
efficiency considerations counsel against use of the essential
facility doctrine to prevent exclusion. However, bridge cases are
probably more troublesome because application of the doctrine
militates against the kind of long-term commitments that must
be enforced in order to protect incentives to invest in facilities
in which a large part of the cost is sunk.8 The location category is actually a residual grouping that includes facilities that
do not fall in either of the other categories.
A.

Bridge Cases

Bridge cases, exemplified by Terminal Railroad and Otter
Tail, involve access to some high-fixed, low-marginal cost facility.81 When the market serviced by such a facility is sufficiently small, the structural requirements of natural monopoly will

79.

NEALE, supra note 6, at 66, seems to discuss this type of case when de-

scribing the typical essential facility dispute: "Classic 'bottleneck' situations have
arisen in the transport industries; the only accessible site for a railway or bus

terminal in a city, for example, comes under the control of established concerns,
and new entrants must either be allowed to share the facilities or fail."
80.
It is not proven below that the social cost from applying the essential
facility doctrine in "bridge" category cases is greater than that arising from its application in joint venture" category cases. In both areas, application of the doctrine
might yield a net loss to society, however the types of losses generated are different.
81.
On the economic problems raised by such facilities, see R. H. Coase, The
Marginal Cost Controuersy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (1946); Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6
ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938); W. Arthur Lewis, The Two-Part Tariff, 8 ECONOMICA
249 (1941); Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey
Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q. J. ECON. 77 (1971).
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be satisfied. For this reason, government regulation is often a
background feature in this category.
Regulation complicates matters greatly and suggests special reasons for permitting or perhaps encouraging essential
facility suits. For example, compulsory sharing may be expected under the regulatory regime, so that it is unlikely that
exclusion is really a necessary means of recouping investments.82 Alternatively, regulation itself may facilitate purely
anticompetitive acquisitions. Still, these arguments do not
apply in every case,83 and, for this reason, an examination of
the underlying economics remains useful.
Because the cost of providing additional service is low, the
denial of access to competitors in cases involving access to a
high-fixed, low-marginal cost facility seems unfair. However,
the original builder of the facility must recoup its sunk investments in some way, and this may require excluding potential
users.
Consider an example. Suppose firm A supplies electricity to
the city Noplace. In order to get power to the residents of
Noplace and other adjacent cities, firm A builds a series of
transmission lines. The cost of building the lines is high, but
there is no other way to get power to Noplace.
The efficient way for the residents to pay for power is to
compensate firm A up front for building the transmission lines
and pay marginal cost for the power supplied to them. However, this is generally infeasible. In the typical real-world solution
to this problem, the residents compensate the builder by paying
more than marginal cost for power. But this solution brings
forth new problems. If given the option, consumers will prefer
to replace firm A, the original supplier, with an alternative
cheaper supplier. If a potential supplier can gain access to firm
A's transmission lines without compensating A for the cost of
building them, it may be able to offer power at a lower price
even though it is a less efficient supplier. Thus, consumers, as
a group, have an incentive to defect from the original contract,
and alternative suppliers have an incentive to exploit

32.
Of course, this still begs the question whether a compulsory sharing rule is
itself justifiable. I consider this question in this section. In order to answer this I
focus on the underlying economics in analyzing the fact patterns.
33.
For example, in Otter Tail there was no expectation of compulsory sharing
under the Federal Power Commission's regulation of electricity generation. Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375 (1973).
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ready-to-use transmission lines. However, if it were clear to the
original supplier at the beginning that the residents would
later replace it with another source, and that this other source
could gain access to its lines at a nonremunerative rate, it
would seek to recover its investment in transmission lines up
front. Since the consumers would probably not be able to pay
for the structure up front - indeed this is why they are paying
more than marginal cost for power - the electricity would
never be supplied.
This is a commitment problem, similar in almost all respects to the much older one of taxing capital.8 4 Once the capital stock is in place it makes a fine source of tax revenue because it is not about to disappear quickly. However, if the government announced this as its policy, or failed to convince
entreprenuers that it would never take this route, capital
growth would shrink accordingly.
The essential facility doctrine presents itself as an obvious
problem. Application of the doctrine may allow an alternative
power source to gain access to firm A's transmission lines at a
price that fails to compensate A for the loss of exclusive use of
the structure.85 The savings might then be passed on to the
consumer, but there is no sense in which this power is cheaper
for society. Of course, the alternative source might be able to
offer power more cheaply because it is a more efficient supplier
of power. But if this is the case, it should be able to compensate A for the use of the facility and still profit from the deal.
Even in this case, however, the alternative supplier will prefer,
other things equal, to gain access at the cheapest rate. The
possibility of gaining such access through invoking the essen-

84.
See Stanley Fischer, Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation and the Benevolent
Dissembling Government, 2 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 93 (1980).
85.
What makes this problem special, and possibly tragic, is that the structure
involved may be "specific" to its use. For example, transmission lines are generally
useful only for transmitting power. For this reason the investment in transmission
lines is a sunk as well as fixed cost for firm A. See, e.g., JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE,
supra note 63, at 65. If the facility were not specific in this sense, it probably

would not be considered unusual to require an alternative generator to build its
own transmission lines, while firm A adapted its lines to some other use. Because
firm A's structure is use-specific it would be inefficient to duplicate the structure.
For a more general treatment of the problems of opportunism arising in
transactions involving use-specific assets, see Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978).
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tial facility doctrine provides an incentive for opportunistic
behavior.
The phenomenon of new suppliers seeking access to existing facilities at rates cheaper than the market would provide
presents a potential for "cream-skimming" entry. 6 Although
the cream-skimming entrant can offer a lower price to consumers than the incumbent firm, it is not a cheaper producer. The
problem is observed for the most part in areas where government regulates prices or quantities. For example, the charge of
cream-skimming entry has figured prominently in discussions
of the litigation involving AT&T, the government, and rival
long-distance communications companies. Put simply, AT&T
was forced through regulation to subsidize local telephone service by keeping its rates on long distance service high." This
encouraged entry by MCI and other firms, though the evidence
bearing on whether AT&T was or is a cheaper producer seems
to be inconclusive.8" Another example is the regulation of natural gas extraction from fields in which more than one party
claims a property right. Extraction formulae which are rela86.
See, e.g., BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYs ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
REGULATION, 61-94 (David Evans ed., 1983). The theoretical complaint against
cream-skimming entry can be described in a simple diagram. In the diagram
below, the cream-skimming entrant (firm 2) underprices firm 1 because firm 1 is
forced by government regulators to charge p,. If, under an optimal regulatory
scheme, firm 1 would be charging a price equal to AC,, the welfare loss resulting
from this state of regulation is given by the area C+E+D. Even comparing the
outcome in which firm 2 underprices firm 1 with that in which firm 1 charges the
higher price, it is not clear that society gains from the cream-skimmer's entry. The
net change in welfare in this case is given by the area B - C.
Economic Rents and Essential Facilities
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87.
See Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T
Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1983); see
also William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 257 (1985).
88.
Recent reports suggest that MCI, with 10% of the long-distance telephone
market, and US Sprint, with roughly 7%, are gradually being recognized as stable
sources of competition against AT&T, which has 70% of the long-distance market.
See For MCI at 20, Fewer Growing Pains, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1988, at D3; Calvin
Sims, US Sprint Seen Turning a Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1988, at D1.
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tively generous to a given type of extractor, for example, owners of relatively small claims, encourage entry and
overproduction by such owners.8 9
One way that firm A may be able to protect its investment
is to require the consumers to accept a sufficiently long term
contract, binding the city to deal exclusively with A. However,
limits must be placed on such a contract; such franchises are'
never granted, or effectively extended, for an indefinite period." If firm A was not guaranteed an exclusive franchise (or
receipt of an adequate rental fee from an alternative supplier
given access to its lines) long enough to recoup its investment
costs plus a normal profit, firm A might require consumers to
forfeit use of the transmission lines if they choose another
supplier within the period required to recoup the costs of constructing the system of lines.9 If such an agreement were enforceable, consumers and alternative suppliers would, obviously, have less incentive to replace the original supplier before it
could recover its costs.
But the enforceability of a contract which requires consumers to forgo use of the transmission lines of the original supplier upon switching to an alternative supplier is itself doubtful if
courts apply the essential facility doctrine to force
facility-owners to grant access to competitors. Thus, it may be
impossible for developers of cost-reducing facilities to design
contractual covenants which permit them to avoid the
disincentives to investment exacerbated by an essential facility
doctrine.9 2
Another type of essential facility claim arising in cases
which involve access to a high-fixed, low-marginal cost facility
involves charges of access granted at discriminatory rates rath89.
The allocation problem in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972)
provides an excellent example of this.
90.
For example, the franchises at issue in the Otter Tail litigation were from
ten to twenty years. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 57
(D. Minn. 1971), affd, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (The district court's opinion will be
referred to as Otter Tail L The Supreme Court's opinion is referred to simply as
Otter Tail.).
91.
This is not what happened in Otter Tail, but is close enough to be worth
considering.
92.
This is suggested by the holding in Otter Tail. Conflict between contractual
commitment and antitrust law is not unique to this area, see, e.g., Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). The effect is to encourage vertical
integration as a substitute for contractual commitment and to discourage commitments which cannot be effected through integration.
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er than exclusion altogether. In this type of case, a discriminatory pricing charge is probably hard to avoid. The pricing of
access to a high-fixed, low-marginal cost facility has been a
topic of controversy in economics for a long time.9"
Consider another example. Suppose several firms involved
in transportation compensate a bridge builder up front for the
cost of constructing a bridge and agree to pay marginal cost for
each use of the bridge. The firms form a club whose members
pay marginal cost for use of the bridge after paying an initial
fee to gain entry into the club. If non-members are allowed to
use the bridge at marginal cost, the bridge builder would suffer
a loss on every use by an outsider, and the club members
would probably have to make up for the loss by paying higher
dues. However, making everyone join the club would cause
infrequent users to complain that they were being forced to
subsidize more frequent users.
In broad terms, the pricing problem reduces to choosing
something between two extremes: having everyone pay average
cost or having everyone pay marginal cost with a lump sum
payment for the cost of construction imposed on some group.
Charging everyone average cost is nondiscriminatory, and
therefore presumably not subject to attack under the essential
facility doctrine. But it is inefficient. Consumers facing a choice
between bridge and ferry use may choose the ferry even
though, on the margin, it is a more costly mode of transportation. On the other hand, charging everyone marginal cost
leaves the lump sum payment to be borne by someone. The
question is who should bear it. Trying to spread it among users
in some form (e.g. a two-part tariff, Ramsey pricing94 ) will
leave some users feeling discriminated against.
To summarize, cases which involve access to high-fixed,
low-marginal cost resources are particularly troublesome for
application of the essential facility doctrine. One problem is
that the doctrine runs counter to the kind of long-term commitments that must sometimes be made in order to encourage
investments in which a large portion of the cost is sunk. There
are two types of social costs generated by application of the
essential facility in this category: loss from discouraging invest-

93.
See, e.g., Hotelling, supra note 81. However, the history of this literature
begins well before 1938.
94.
See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONoMIC ANALYSIS 223-25 (1978) (discussing the
Ramsey pricing formula).
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ment in certain facilities and an additional loss resulting from
cream-skimming entry. Further, the doctrine's emphasis on
non-discriminatory access ignores the special economic prob95
lems presented by high-fixed, low-marginal cost resources.
In order to flesh out the argument I consider below the treatment of these issues in two prominent "bridge category" essential facility cases.
1.

Terminal Railroad

The case involving access to a high-fixed, low-marginal cost
facility that is cited most often in support of the essential facility doctrine is Terminal Railroad.9" However, the connection
between its facts and the economic arguments that might justify the essential facility doctrine has received relatively little
examination.9
In Terminal Railroadthe government brought suit seeking
the dissolution of a combination which controlled all of the
means of entry into St. Louis by rail crossing the Mississippi
River. The principal defendant was the Terminal Railroad
Association of St. Louis (hereafter TRA), a corporation organized under an 1889 agreement between Jay Gould and several
railroad companies for the purpose of acquiring all of the independent terminal companies (companies connecting rail lines
with bridge and ferry services) at St. Louis. When the corporation was formed there were two ways to get a railroad car
across the river into St. Louis: by rail over the Eads Bridge or
by a boat operated by the Wiggins Ferry Company. A third way
of getting into St. Louis, the Merchants' Bridge, was then under construction. Shortly after its formation TRA acquired the
Eads Bridge and its system of terminals.
The Merchants' Bridge was completed in 1890. Not long
after that, the proviso in the act of Congress authorizing its
construction which forbade ownership of its stock by a stockholder in any other railway bridge company was eliminated,
and TRA acquired the bridge. Then in 1892 the Rock Island
Railroad Company and TRA tried to outbid each other for control of the stock of the Wiggins Ferry Company. The bidding
war was settled with the companies coming to an agreement

95.
96.
97.

See Lewis, supra note 81.
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
The exception is AREEDA & HovENKAMP, supra note 9,
736.1b.
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under which Rock Island would become a joint owner of TRA in
exchange for transferring its shares in Wiggins at cost.
The Court held that TRA's combination of facilities violated
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. It remanded the case to
the district court with directions that "a decree be ...

entered

directing the parties to submit... a plan for the reorganization
of the contract" between the defendant railroad companies and
TRA98 The reorganization was, among other things, to require that TRA provide for the admission of other railroads99
on "just and reasonable" terms and provide for the use of terminal facilities by non-member railroads upon such "just and reasonable terms and regulations as will... place every such

company upon as nearly an equal plane as may be .... "'
Unlike Otter Tail, and other cases falling in the "bridge"
category,"0 ' Terminal Railroad has very little to do with exclusion. There were no complaints of exclusion or denial of
access to the routes controlled by TRA. 02 Unanimous consent
of members was required in order for a new corporation to become a joint owner,' but the defendants claimed that no applicant would be denied entry.' 4 Apparently no evidence was
put forth to contradict this. The Court discusses at length complaints concerning arbitrary and discriminatory charges," 5
but this seems to be the only evidence of anything about which
the customers/competitors of TRA might have complained.
As already noted, pricing disputes are probably unavoidable in a case such as this. This is not to say that TRA was not
charging monopoly rates, or at least trying to raise the costs of
non-proprietary rivals. 6 Unless scale economies existed in
running several terminal facilities, the desire to gain a competitive advantage over rivals seems to be a very likely explanation of TRA's combination of facilities. However, given that the
fixed costs had to be distributed among the bridge users, it is

98.
224 U.S. at 411.
99.
There were 10 remaining; 14 of the 24 railroads then using the St. Louis
terminals were members of TRA. Id. at 399.
100.
Id. at 411.
101.
See, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
102.
224 U.S. at 400. Indeed, a recent study argues that TRA neither excluded
competitors nor charged discriminatory rates, see Reiffen & Kleit, supra note 19.
103.
224 U.S. at 400.
104.
Id.
105.
Id. at 407-08.
106.
See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 67, at 234.
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unlikely that a set of rates could be devised that seemed fair to
all of them. The efficient solution would have been for all of the
bridge users to become joint owners of TRA and pay marginal
cost for use of the facilities,"ar but this may have seemed unfair to the infrequent users.
As for the essential facility doctrine, particularly its statement by Neale, Terminal Railroadhas ambiguous implications.
In one passage the Court expresses hostility to the notion that
facilities that cannot practicably be duplicated by competitors
must be shared."' The Court's remedy might be taken as
providing support for the notion that facilities must be shared
on fair terms, but the remedy did not require the non-proprietary companies to be treated the same as the joint owners of
TRA. The finding of a Sherman Act violation relied on the mere
fact of the combination coupled with what the Court considered
as extraordinary terminal conditions at St. Louis. Nothing in
the opinion suggests that the Court was setting forth a principle as general as that expressed by Neale.
2. Otter Tail
The example of power generation in Noplace, discussed
earlier, pointed out the commitment problem presented in Otter
Tail. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree enjoining the
Otter Tail Power Company from refusing to wheel electric power, but the decree also provided that the company "shall not be
compelled... to furnish wholesale electric service or wheeling
service to a municipality except at rates which are compensatory and under terms and conditions which are filed and subject
to approval by the Federal Power Commission." °9 This was
not very different from what was already required of Otter Tail
under the Federal Power Act."' Putting this aside, however,

107.
This was the suggestion of one of the defendant's witnesses. 224 U.S. at
405-06.
108.
It cannot be controverted that, in ordinary circumstances, a number of
independent companies might combine for the purpose of controlling or
acquiring terminals for their common but exclusive use. In such cases
other companies might be admitted upon terms or excluded altogether. If
such terms were too onerous, there would ordinarily remain the right and
power to construct their own terminals.
Id. at 405.
109.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375 (1973).
110.
The Federal Power Commission could, under certain conditions, compel a
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the district court and Supreme Court opinions (Otter Tail I and
Otter Tail respectively) display insensitivity to the economic
issues discussed in this paper."'
The Otter Tail Power Company argued that its conduct
was "fully justified by its legitimate right to fight for its corporate life, remain viable in serving the public and prevent the
erosion of its integrated system and the impairment of its credit."" Whatever the stated reasons, Otter Tail probably would
have lost money if it had granted access to the Bureau of Reclamation and other suppliers. Otter Tail had agreed in 1955 to
wheel power provided by the Bureau of Reclamation and several other sources on the condition that it would be under no
obligation to make lines going to its retail customers available
to such sources.113 In return, these sources paid a wheeling
fee to Otter Tail. Since the terms of the wheeling agreement
were set under the condition restricting the availability of Otter Tail's lines, one must suppose that the wheeling fee was
much lower than it would have been if such a restriction were
not part of the contract. If the restriction had not been part of
the agreement, Otter Tail would have sought to recover a much
larger share of the cost of its system of transmission lines in
the wheeling fee charged under the 1955 agreement.
The decision in Otter Tail I essentially eliminated the
restriction governing the availability of Otter Tail's lines. Far

public utility to interconnect with the facilities of another energy supplier, though
whether the commission was authorized to use such power for the purpose of
promoting competition was unclear. Id. at 375 n.7. However, the "power to direct
wheeling [was] left to the 'voluntary coordination of electric facilities.'" Id. at 376.
Given that the Federal Power Commission was not itself authorized to compel
wheeling, an order requiring Otter Tail to provide wheeling services, but at the
same time leaving it up to the Commission to oversee the terms of the wheeling
agreement, could not have sul-stantially altered Otter Tail's obligations to other
energy suppliers under the Federal Power Act.
111.
As the only essential facility case involving exclusion from some high-fixed,
low-marginal cost facility (note that there was no exclusion in Terminal Railroad)
to reach the Supreme Court, its treatment is suggestive of the problems courts
have in reaching economically sensible decisions in these cases.
An entirely different way of looking at Otter Tail is to view the case as involving a regulated corporation trying to misuse governmental processes to produce an
anticompetitive effect. See, e.g., BoRK, supra note 76, at 354-55. A discussion of
Otter Tail which is somewhat closer to the view presented here is provided in
John W. Shenefield, Antitrust Policy Within the Electric Utility Industry, 16 ANTITRUST BULL 681, 697-705 (1971).
112.
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Minn.
1971), affd, 410 U.S. 366 (197-2).
113.
Id. at 63.
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from recognizing that the restriction lowered wheeling rates
and consequently lowered prices for some consumers, the district court found the restriction a territorial allocation scheme,
unlawful per se under the Sherman Act."
B.

Joint Venture Cases

The second fact pattern involves an attempt by firm B to
gain entry into a joint venture of some sort, such as the news
sharing network discussed in Associated Press. Perhaps the
best example is the research consortium. Because there are
external benefits from specialization and cross-fertilization,
such projects are often proposed. However, as the number of
members increases, the likely contribution of an additional
member falls. And, more importantly, the incentive for a given
member to free ride on the efforts of others increases, particularly so if the firms compete vigorously in the market in which
they aim to sell." 5 As the number of members increases, a
point is reached at which the losses resulting from congestion,
slackened effort generated by the greater incentive to free ride,
and the increasing cost of communicating information to all the
participants begin to outweigh the benefits from joint activity.
Because of these reasons, such groups are likely to limit the
number of members they take." 6
It is difficult for an outside observer to determine whether
the exclusion of a firm seeking entry into a joint venture is
based on anticompetitive purposes (i.e., because the party seeking entry cannot be trusted to collude with members) or simply
technological or efficiency considerations (i.e., what allowing
entry would do to incentives of members)." 7
In Associated Press, the government complained in part of
the practice which allowed each member of AP to "block mem-

114.
Id.
115.
See, e.g., Lightning Strikes Semiconductors, THE ECONOMIST, June 11, 1988,
at 65, 66 ("Consortia which attempt to share research among competitors have a
poor track record, even in Japan. Dissension and lack of results stalled Japan's
'Fifth Generation Project' in advanced computing.").
116.
The economic literature covering this problem is labeled "club-theory." See
James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965); Todd
Sandler & John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative
Survey, 18 J. ECON. Lrr. 1481 (1980).
117.
For an example where allowing entry would probably have undesirable
effects on the incentives of participants in a joint venture, consider the case of a Japanese firm asking to join Sematech, see David E. Sanger, NEC Wants Part in U.S.
Chip Project, N.Y. TIIES, Aug. 15, 1988, at Di.
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bership by competing newspapers and thereby remain the exclusive outlet for AP news in its locality.""' The AP network
Was comprised of over 1200 newspapers who shared both a pool
of information and the costs of gathering that information.
However, the network established oppressive entry requirements for papers in local competition with existing members.
The Court held that the entrance requirement effectively
blocked entry, creating an illegal combination.
As is generally true of cases in the joint venture category,
efficiency arguments can be made in support of the
consortium's decision to deny access to an applicant. 119 In
this case, two fairly obvious arguments can be presented in
favor of AP's veto rule. First, the rule preserved incentives for
agencies to gather news; an AP member would have little incentive to gather news if it then had to share it with its local
competitor. Second, although the incentive to form an organization like AP exists because there are technological benefits
from pooling information in the news industry, such benefits
are likely to be very small in the case of a newspaper that is
the local competitor of a member newspaper. The costs of accepting such a newspaper as a member, even ignoring its effect
on the incentives of the competitor member to gather news,
may easily outweigh the negligible pooling benefits. Thus, even
without granting veto power to any particular member newspaper, a rule flatly denying entry to any firm that was the local
competitor of a member newspaper may have been efficient.
This is why the claim that "less restrictive alternatives" exist,
if used to justify forcing a consortium such as AP to take additional members, should carry little force on efficiency
118.
PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
CASES 380-81 (4th ed. 1988).
119.
The facts of United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th
Cir. 1980), place it within the category of cases considered here. The defendant
was a corporation, organized by eight real estate brokers, which controlled the only
real estate multiple-listing service in Columbus, Georgia. The association required
that members have a favorable credit report and business reputation, maintain an
active real estate office open during customary hours, and pay a $1,000 fee for a
share of stock. Id. at 1351. The court found the restrictions unreasonable.
As the court's discussion of the case makes clear, maintaining the listing
service required a certain amount of effort from each of the members. For example,
each had to contribute listings, and take care in showing property without the
assistance of the listing broker. See, e.g., id. at 1356. Obviously, allowing open
membership would permit some brokers to join who were unable to contribute as
expected, and provide incentives for others to join in order to free ride off the
efforts of incumbent members.
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grounds.' Accepting additional members when the pooling
benefits are zero merely limits the incentive of the consortium
to expand and provide more of its product at a lower cost.
Yet an argument can be made that AP's rule had an
anticompetitive purpose. Being a member of AP was equivalent
to having access to a cost-reducing facility, since any particular
piece of news of a given quality could be gathered more cheaply
through the network than through hunting down interviews.
Thus, admitting the local competitor of a member newspaper
would allow the locally-competing newspapers to compete on
the same cost terms. If the firms chose to compete with shared
access to the AP network, consumers would be better off, provided that safeguards kept the firms from trying to free ride on
each other's work. Under the veto rule at issue, a firm operating with access to AP's network might say to its local competitor; "If you want to join, I'll vote you in - provided we both
charge twice what we're charging now." If the local competitor
agreed, consumers would be hurt, at least until an entrant arrived. In this sense, a firm's decision to deny access to its local
competitor may reflect only its awareness that its competitor
could not be trusted to collude after gaining access to the network.
A firm denied access to the AP network might use the
essential facility doctrine in a procompetitive manner to gain
access. However, the potential procompetitive benefits are necessarily limited. Although the Court speaks in Associated Press
as if local competitors who could not gain access to the AP
network were unable to compete with newspapers that had
access, the opposite is true. Newspapers operating without
access to AP provided competition to their better-off local counterparts; their existence forced AP members to share the cost
advantages provided by access to the AP network with the
consuming public. If a policy of forcing local competitors to
share access to the AP network is going to benefit consumers, it
must provide benefits beyond those provided by existing competition, and these benefits must outweigh losses likely to result
from either the collusion of member newspapers sharing the
same market or the likely dilution of incentives to contribute

120.

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, $ 736.1c argue that Associated Press

could have simply prevented competing newspapers from sharing information rather
than implementing the veto rule at issue. This would no doubt have been costly,
and the benefits probably would have been very small.
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within the network.' 2 ' Further, if there are significant sunk
costs in setting up a news-sharing network, a rule requiring
open membership, to the extent it enhances price competition,
will discourage efforts to set up such ventures.
C. Location Cases
A third, residual category of fact patterns includes the
attempt by firm B to share in the locational advantage enjoyed
by firm A. To see in broad terms what the underlying economic
issues are, consider another highly simplified example. Suppose
firm A runs the only ice cream stand on a certain beach. It
puts the stand in the most desirable location: smack in the
middle. Because of its location, A is able to charge a higher
price than B, whose ice cream stand is located on the road by
the beach. But if A raises its price too high, customers will
walk to B's stand on the road. Thus, as in the more general
model presented earlier, firm A is forced by the competition
from firm B to share the value of its locational advantage with
consumers.
Firm B would like to set up an ice cream stand on the
same beach. The efficient solution would require firm A to
position itself to one side, with one quarter of the beach to one
side and three quarters of the beach to the other, and firm B to
position itself symmetrically to the other side of the midpoint.
But in an unregulated market, the two firms will choose to
occupy the middle." Further, as far as B is concerned, the
middle of the beach is an essential facility."2 If A remains in
the middle of the beach and B is forced to move to either side,
it will remain at a competitive disadvantage."

121.

Because this conclusion is uncertain, it can obviously not be determined a

priori whether such suits are providing benefits to consumers. It should, however,
be clear that a compulsory sharing (i.e., open membership) rule is inefficient. An
intermediate position that might be justifiable, on efficiency grounds, is for the

courts to examine suits on a case-by-case basis to determine whether efficiency
losses are likely to outweigh competitive pricing gains.
122.
Further, this is inefficient. See Harold Ilotelling, Stability in Competition,
39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). For an illuminating discussion of spatial competition, see
SCHERER, supra note 45, at 252-58.
123.
It follows from this that there is nothing inherently efficient about firm B's
desire to share the middle. Thus, Hotelling's model of spatial competition suggests

that even if requiring that an "essential location" be shared would benefit consumers, there may still be an alternative allocation of territory that would benefit
consumers more.
124.
This example demonstrates that the location category is similar in many
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Can consumers be made better off by forcing A to share the
middle of the beach with B? Clearly not if the two firms collude." If the firms compete, both sharing the same location,
consumers could be better off. However, consumers may be
hurt in the long run if A is denied the exclusive enjoyment of
its locational advantage, especially if there are significant sunk
costs in developing locational advantages.
I have noted already that Gamco falls into this residual
category. No efficiency justifications were offered by the defendants in Gamco, and the facts do not suggest efficiency arguments. 1" For example, the defendants were not involved in a
collaborative, cost-reducing effort which would be worthwhile
only if the plaintiff, or competitors in the plaintiff's position,
were excluded. In this sense, Gamco is different from Associated Press. The alternative justification for exclusion is that it
was necessary in order to protect rents. 27 If the firms occupying the building were all operating under an agreement not
to compete, then it would obviously be necessary to exclude lessees who would not comply with the agreement. Indeed, it
might be argued that without this sort of agreement, there
would have been no incentive to build the structure in the first
place. But this argument assumes that some significant portion
of the cost of the building was otherwise non-recoverable (i.e.,

respects to the other paradigms discussed. The additional insight the location cases
provide is the "Iotelling competition" problem: B's sharing of A's locational advantage may be inferior to an alternative spatial allocation. This might just as easily
be true of B's desire to share any cost advantage possessed by A; there may be a
Pareto superior alternative. Only in a world of Coasean bargaining between firms
and consumers would this alternative be realized. This point, however, has little to
do with applying the essential facility doctrine, for it would be impossible for
courts to determine Pareto superior allocations. The question is whether consumers
might benefit from requiring firms to share access.
125.
The same is true if firm A is able to deny firm B the rent earned from the
locational advantage by charging a sufficiently high per unit access fee. If an access fee which is high enough to fully compensate firm A is charged, only a lump
sum fee would allow the two firms to compete.
126.
But this does not mean that such arguments cannot be made anyway. Suppose, for example, that the group of firms leasing space in the building provided
benefits that were shared within the group. Then exclusion of the plaintiff in
Gamco may have been justifiable on economic grounds. For such an argument, see
Gerber, supra note 62, at 1098-99.
127.
The evidence suggested that Gamco's exclusion was prompted by its affiliation with an out-of-state competitor. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce
Bldg. Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir.) ("It was undisputed, for example, that
Gamco's exclusion was contemporaneous with and grew out of its affiliation with
the non-Rhode Island Sawyer & Co."), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
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sunk). While it is impossible to tell whether this was true on
the basis of the facts given in the case, it seems superficially
unlikely. The building's location was probably valuable to many
alternative users.
D. Summary
The essential facility doctrine is inconsistent with the protection of rents earned through the ownership of a cost-reducing facility. These rents can be reduced by compulsory sharing
in two ways: from the resultant price competition, or from a
reduction in the cost-advantage provided by the facility. The
latter outcome is presumably one that should be avoided altogether. The former is undesirable if the rent earned is needed
in order to recover sunk costs.
This argument can be stated in terms of two variables:
rivalry in the consumption of benefits provided by the facility," and the extent to which the costs of acquiring or developing the facility are sunk. Rivalry in the consumption of benefits is the problem I emphasized in discussing cases falling in
the joint venture category. Sunk costs, though they may be
observed in almost any case, are likely to be observed in cases
involving access to high-fixed, low-marginal cost facilities.
In cases where "consumption-rivalry" is significant, a general compulsory sharing rule is undesirable. Further, caseby-case application of the essential facility doctrine will benefit
consumers only if courts make special efforts to determine
whether or not forcing entry will generate undesirable results.'29 The consumer welfare implications of the doctrine
are also unfavorable in cases involving "sunk cost" facilities.

128.
Alternatively, this might be described as the case in which members of the
"facility" voluntarily provide public goods (e.g., research results) which make the arrangement valuable. For an interesting discussion of rivalry and its implications for
the theory of public goods, see WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY
707.08 (3d ed. 1985).
129.
For example, in examining joint .venture category cases like Associated
Press, courts would not require the consortium to accept all applicants. In each
case the court would determine whether the benefits from the price competition
permitted by requiring entry are likely to exceed efficiency losses. I should note
that this approach seems to be required by the reasoning of Continental T.V. Inc.,
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (upholding manufacturer's location restrictions in franchise agreements). If a producer can prevent retailers from competing
in price in order to support the provision of services to customers, it seems that
the argument can be made that the AP network can exclude parties for precisely
the same reason.
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These propositions are substantially weakened by the pres-

ence of regulation. In regulated industries the doctrine is justifiable as a sort of public trust doctrine for regulatory regimes,
preventing firms from exploiting welfare-reducing transfers of
property rights from the government.' 30
It follows that there is a set of cases, arising in unregulated markets, in which compulsory sharing could benefit consumers - specifically, cases in which consumption-rivalry is insignificant, and the stream of rents is not necessary to compensate the facility owner for risk or for sunk costs. But this raises
the question whether courts will be successful in distinguishing
this subset of cases from the others. Unless courts are sufficiently good at recognizing these cases, the doctrine's overall
effect could be to reduce consumer welfare.
Since the earliest price-fixing cases, antitrust courts have
shied away from questions that would require judges to tackle
questions typically considered by public utlity regulators, such
as the reasonableness of prices. 3 ' A similar proposition can
be stated in this area. My argument suggests that determining

whether application of the essential facility doctrine will enhance welfare in a particular case will involve courts in solving

problems no less difficult than determing the reasonableness of
130.
Two types of problem might emerge under regulatory regimes. The first is
where state regulation has allowed the facility owner to acquire a facility which
raises competitor's costs (e.g., the economically unjustifiable copyright). I have
argued that this type of acquisition is unlikely to occur in markets in which
substitute facilities can appear and there is competitive bidding for acquisition.
Since neither of these conditions may hold in a regulated setting, a compulsory
sharing rule is more likely to provide benefits under such a regime. The second,
and closely related, case is where regulation permits a state-granted monopoly to
charge a monopoly rent for access to some resource. For example, it has been suggested that the British government's recent effort to lower prices for telephone
service by introducing competition has failed because British Telecom (before its
privatization a largely state-owned monopoly) is able to charge a monopoly rent to
its only (state-authorized) competitor for access to local interconnections. See The
Regulatory Two-Step, THE ECONONMST, Jan. 21, 1989, at 69. This interpretation of
regulatory failure can be applied, in the copyright area, to the facts of West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1070 (1987). The issue presented was whether Mead, producer of LEXIS,
could provide the corresponding page numbers of West's reports of federal and
state court opinions in its computerized reports of court opinions. In "essential
facility" terms, Mead sought access to West's page numbers. West's page numbers
are important because courts require lawyers to use them in referring to cases in
briefs. This is obviously a state-granted monopoly. Permitting West to claim copyright protection in its page numbers, which the court did, allows it to charge a
monopoly rent for access to them.
131.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 331-32 (1897).
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prices. 132 A general presumption against the essential facility
plaintiff in cases not involving a facility whose ownership was
determined by government regulation (e.g., a patent) may be
better than leaving it to the courts to find the set of cases in
which the doctrine is economically justifiable.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is not unusual to run across language in antitrust opinions to the effect that denying competitors access to a
cost-reducing facility is an anticompetitive abuse of monopoly
power. These comments are generally not supported by economic theory. Firms denied access do in fact compete against firms
that have access to cost-reducing facilities, and such competition forces the latter to share its cost advantage with consumers. A compulsory sharing rule will not necessarily improve
upon this result. If shared-access supports collusion, then consumers might be made worse off by a compulsory sharing rule.
This is the most obvious sense in which the essential facility
doctrine is flawed. In addition to this, even if shared-access
generally does not lead to collusion, it would still not follow
that a compulsory sharing rule benefits consumers. A compulsory sharing rule may reduce incentives to develop
cost-reducing facilities, or it may lead to inefficient sharing
which reduces the cost advantage provided by the facility.
These arguments suggest the possible dangers in undiscriminating application of the essential facility doctrine to grant
competitors access to cost-reducing facilities.
This paper categorizes fact patterns, with a view toward
identifying cases in which application of the doctrine is likely to
benefit consumers. Although there may substantial scope for
the doctrine to provide benefits in regulated settings, in unregulated markets that scope seems to be narrow.

132.
See Owen, supra note 16 (concluding generally that the economic problems
raised by essential facility claims are too complicated for courts to solve); Werden,
supra note 33.

